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Abstract 
 
Government contracting has experienced an explosion of 
available data in the last decade, marked by the rise of 
the global Open Contracting Data Standard. However, it 
remains largely under-utilized for Big Data analytics and 
embedding findings in policy making. In order to 
address this gap and promote the use of government 
administrative data for policy making, this paper 
provides a review on the availability, scope and quality 
of datasets in government contracting in 35 European 
countries and highlights prominent use cases to inspire 
policy makers and civil society. State of the art findings 
come from the ongoing Horizon2020-funded research 
project led by the University of Cambridge, called 
DIGIWHIST, which benchmarks, standardizes, and 
republishes public procurement data across Europe 
while also providing key performance indicators directly 
relevant for policy. Use cases demonstrate how civil 
society can use Big Data to hold governments 
accountable; and how governments can use advanced 
market analytics for detecting collusive competitors and 
safeguarding public spending.  
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1   The potential of Big Data 
approach in government contracting 
 
Public procurement is the purchase by governments and 
state-owned enterprises of goods, services and works. It is 
one of the largest government spending activities in any 
country, representing on average up to 13% of GDP in 
OECD countries, and up to 29% of general government 
expenditure. At the same time, it is perceived to be the 
most corrupt government function across the globe ahead 
of justice or taxation rendering it a key driver behind 
popular discontent with governments and inefficient public 
spending. Even though governments throughout the globe, 
and across Europe in particular, are producing large 
amounts of administrative data describing public 
procurement contracts and tenders, this information has 
been left largely unused for research and policy purposes 
up until recent years. Applying a Big Data approach which 
combines diverse data sources is expected to unlock a 
whole new world for policy and research potentially 
contributing to better quality public services. Since public 
procurement involves millions of contract awards each 
year across Europe and is prone to corruption and budget 
deficit risks, high quality open data and Big Data analytics 
are indispensable for the efficient and accountable use of 
public resources.  
However, a wide range of fundamental difficulties emerge 
when these datasets are actually put in use. On the one 
hand, a number of technical problems have to be sorted out 
before any analysis can take place. In most countries, 
public procurement data were not produced with the 
purpose of using it in statistical analysis, so even the 
simplest operations – like aggregating the contract values 
of a contracting authority over time – requires 
programming skills. The data need to be downloaded, 
extensively cleaned and restructured before one can start 
analysing the data.  
On the other hand, more substantial problems occur 
regarding the legal context of public procurement. National 
and EU laws need to be thoroughly understood in order to 
interpret the data correctly. This is crucial especially when 
comparing countries or making comparisons over time. 
Tackling these problems requires much effort both in terms 
of financial and human resources, which is beyond the 
power of most research groups, let alone ordinary users. 
This need for pre-processing public procurement 
databases, i.e. lowering the entry barriers for ordinary 
users, before wider, regular use can take place motivates 
the recent surge in research projects and government 
programmes in this field, including DIGIWHIST.  
 2   DIGIWHIST data and indicators 
DIGIWHIST is a Horizon2020-funded research project, 
which was launched in 2015, led by the University of 
Cambridge. Its goal is to systematically collect, analyse, 
and broadly disseminate tender-level information on public 
procurement in 35 jurisdictions across Europe (EU28+). 
The project involves private and public actors to actively 
collaborate in improving the quality and scope of the data.  
Data collection is carried out after a thorough review of the 
legislation related to public procurement, financial 
disclosure, and conflict of interest restrictions. The results 
of these review is also made available to the public 
(http://europam.eu/) and the comparative analysis of data 
content and quality already lead to a range of policy 
recommendations. 
The collected public procurement data is linked to 
company and public organisation information on finances, 
ownership and management; and to information on 
mechanisms that increase accountability of public officials 
such as conflict of interest regulations.  
Besides the downloaded, cleaned and standardised 
databases, DIGIWHIST will develop and display novel 
indicators on government contracting in terms of 
corruption risks, transparency and administrative quality, 
which will enable citizens to scrutinize and compare 
spending efficiency and quality among different 
government agencies both within and between countries. 
The practical utilization of the project is supported by 
developing web portals, mobile apps, whistle-blower 
reporting functionality and risk assessment software for 
public administrations.  
2.1 Data scope, content and quality 
The core element of the DIGIWHIST data structure 
encompasses national public procurement datasets 
including data reported according to EU-wide rules. The 
collected electronic public announcements, ideally, 
contains the following information on each tender. 
 Information on the contracting authority: name, 
official ID, address, contact info 
 Information on the bidders and the winner 
supplier: name, official ID, address, contact info 
 Information on the object of the procurement: 
description, CPV codes, location, number of lots 
in the contract  
 Procedure type, awarding criteria, requirements 
on bidders, deadlines 
 Information on documentation: free or subject to 
fee 
 Funding: EU-funded or not 
 Estimated and awarded contract values  
 Completion report: quality, timeliness, and final, 
actual price 
 Corrigenda, modifications, cancellations, if any 
 
However, the list of available variables is much shorter in 
most European countries. Depending on diverse national 
legislation, only a fraction of the whole procurement cycle 
is covered by publicly accessible announcements. 
Completion reports are not public in most countries, while 
even contract award notices are not obligatory to publish 
everywhere1. 
The monetary thresholds (see Figure 1), above which the 
national public procurement law is applied in case of 
buying goods, have a decisive influence on the number of 
contract award notices on national public procurement 
portals, hence transparency of bidding markets and public 
spending. In addition, both the exact content of notices and 
the prevalence of missing data can vary greatly which 
again can hinder Big Data analytics. 
The EU-wide Tenders Electronic Daily 
(http://ted.europa.eu/) could serve as a standard, Europe-
wide comparative data source with its uniform reporting 
threshold and data structure. However, it only contains the 
large value contracts supposedly subject to Europe-wide 
interest of bidding firms, missing out on a large number of 
smaller contracts available in national databases.   
Figure 1. Thresholds of obligatory public procurement by 
countries   
 
Data analysis crucially hinges upon linked data allowing 
for a comprehensive assessment of each public 
procurement tender throughout its various stages; hence 
linking procurement notices (e.g. call for tenders and 
contract award notices) of the same tender is imperative. 
Unfortunately, tenders usually don’t have an official, 
unique identification number which appears on all related 
notices. By implication, notices must be matched to each 
other either using internal reference IDs or using more 
                                                 
1 For more information, see: https://okfn.de/en/blog/2016/07/from-
publication-to-award/ 
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approximate methods relying on similarity in terms of 
publication date, title and the name of the contracting 
authority. Experience from a wide range of European 
countries suggests, unfortunately, that any approximate 
matching method is bound to a non-negligible margin of 
error reaching as high as third of tenders. 
 
Assessing organisational behaviour throughout multiple 
transactions over time represents one of the most useful 
outputs of Big Data analytics in this field. In addition, 
linking public procurement data with other administrative 
datasets such as national company registries can 
considerably enhance the scope of data analysis. However, 
any such analysis presupposes that organisations (i.e. 
contracting bodies or bidding firms) are uniquely identified 
by their identification numbers and ideally organisational 
changes can be followed over time. Unfortunately, official 
identification numbers of contracting authorities and 
bidding companies are usually not included in public 
procurement notices, only free texts of organisation name 
and address. Classifying company names based on string 
similarities and assigning IDs by matching to official 
registries could help alleviating this shortcoming but, 
again, not with 100 percent correct result2. 
 
Once we obtained identification numbers assigned to 
organisation names other sources can be linked to the 
public procurement database like company financial data, 
owners and shareholders of companies, treasury accounts 
of public organisations, and list of political officeholders to 
identify companies’ political ties. Although these 
administrative datasets are less complex than public 
procurement data, they raise different concerns. Some of 
them are not freely accessible (e.g. company registry data) 
and they are hard to standardise as they were created under 
different regulations (e.g. treasury accounts of countries).   
One of the main goals of DIGIWHIST is to standardise 
these diverse datasets and republish them in a format 
which is directly amenable for Big Data analytics, if it is 
legally permissible (e.g. some data points may infringe on 
individual privacy rights). Another goal is to offer clear 
interpretation of these data by providing performance 
indicators as discussed below.   
2.3 Performance indicators 
Using high quality datasets as outlined briefly above, a 
wide range of useful performance indicators can be 
developed by a combination of qualitative and quantitative 
methods to describe public sector transparency, 
administrative capacity, and quality of government on 
various analytical levels such as individual tenders, 
                                                 
2 For more information, see: https://okfn.de/blog/2016/06/who-has-won-
the-contract/ 
organisations, regions, or government programmes. These 
indicators are based on objective, hard data produced by 
government administrative systems; they refer to specific 
behavioural patterns of companies and contracting 
authorities, as opposed to subjective perception-based 
surveys currently widely used in this domain. Considerably 
increasing their policy relevance, they can be calculated in 
real-time, allowing for timely policy interventions (e.g. 
halting payments to a company accompanied by high 
corruption risk bidding patterns).  
 
Among many potentially useful and scientifically sound 
indicators in public procurement datasets, one key 
analytical innovation of DIGIWHIST is to measure the risk 
of institutionalised grand corruption in public procurement. 
This type of corruption aims to allocating the public 
contract to a favoured bidder by avoiding open and fair 
competition while also avoiding detection. Hence, such 
corruption necessarily results in restricting access to public 
resources to the many while granting privileged access to a 
few in spite of explicit rules and accepted norms against 
such behaviour. 
Risk indicators can refer to the following elements of the 
procurement procedure. 
 the tender: restricted access to contracts, e.g. by 
using tailored tender conditions,  
 the contracting authority: political control of the 
bureaucracy, e.g. politically motivated 
appointment of executives,  
 the suppliers: signs of risky businesses, e.g. tax 
haven registration, or politics-dependent market 
success  
 political connections: direct/indirect political 
connections of contractors, e.g. same person 
owning the supplier and evaluating tenders. 
 
We demonstrate the procedure of risk indicator 
development with the example of the tender-level 
Corruption Risk Index. First, we define a wide set of 
potential elementary risk indicators (like the weight of non-
price award criteria, or single bidder contracts) based on 
interviews and desk research. Then these indicators are 
tested using regression models, to identify the ones which 
actually contribute to restricted competition across large 
datasets. ‘Restricted competition’ is marked by a single bid 
submitted on an otherwise competitive market or the 
winner company’s high share in the contracting authority’s 
total spending. 
Elementary indicators are combined into a robust 
composite index, Corruption Risk Index, which takes 
values between 0 and 1, higher values meaning higher risks 
of corruption. This index has the advantage that it is more 
robust than single red flags and it can be adjusted to the 
varying legal, business or social context of countries in a 
way that it remains comparable. Last but not least, it can be 
visualised in an intuitive and easy to understand way 
(Figure 2).  
 
 Figure 2 Corruption Risk Index Averages in Europe (TED, 2009-
2014) 
 
 
3   Use cases for civil society and 
governments 
 
Several initiatives already exist which build on the analysis 
of public procurement data using a Big Data approach. 
Some of these projects inspired also DIGIWHIST. In the 
following, two use cases will be discussed where key 
stakeholders have benefitted from using Big Data in public 
procurement in order to inspire others to develop further 
practices and projects embedding newly available data and 
indicators in policy making.  
3.1  Civil society driven watchdog websites  
Civil society driven watchdog websites have been 
launched recently across the globe, for example in the 
Czech Republic (http://zindex.cz/), Hungary 
(tendertracking.eu) and Ukraine 
(https://prozorro.gov.ua/en/). These portals aim to holding 
governments accountable using indicators of good 
governance, corruption, and favouritism. What additional 
value these websites can offer compared to the official 
public procurement portals? While official websites’ 
primary goal is to fulfil their legal obligations by 
publishing administrative notices, these new portals focus 
on providing relevant data in the most easy to interpret 
format, most notably ready-made visualisations and key 
risk indicators. 
 
These websites carry value for several types of users. 
Citizens can look up suspicious projects related to their 
area of interest; investigative journalists can spare time 
when collecting information on specific public 
procurement cases; potential suppliers can explore a new 
public procurement market in advance which they plan to 
enter. Even oversight bodies could benefit from using these 
websites to choosing which organisations to investigate in 
the situation of rare resources. 
 
The Tendertracking website re-publishes information from 
Hungarian, Polish and Romanian (tendertracking.eu, 
pl.tendertracking.eu, and ro.tendertracking.eu) public 
procurement notices. Contracts can be found based on the 
name of authorities or companies, product identifiers, 
value of the tender, and the Corruption Risk Index value of 
the contract. The result is a list of contracts which fulfil the 
search criteria. Not only the most important data are 
published about each contract, but also red flags and 
indices showing corruption risks which helps interpreting 
data and drawing attention to the most suspicious tenders.  
Organisation-level aggregated data and time series are also 
available, displayed with simple visualisations.  Authorities 
and companies can be compared to other organisations or a 
market average regarding the number and value of their 
contracts too.   
Figure 3: Basic information of a contracting authority and 
Corruption Risk Index displayed on Tendertracking 
3.2  Governments detecting collusion among 
bidders 
Governments increasingly use public procurement data in 
an innovative way to detect collusion among suppliers and 
punish anti-competitive behaviour. Examples from 
countries such as Korea, Sweden, and Hungary underline 
the power of Big Data analytics for law enforcement in 
situations where informants and whistleblowers are of 
limited use. 
Signs of collusive behaviour can be detected by analysing 
price-related variables like bid distribution characteristics; 
specific bidding patterns like bid rotation or bid 
suppression; or market structure-related variables such as 
market concentration.  
 
Constructing co-bidding networks of public procurement 
bidders allows for differentiating healthy competition from 
potentially collusive bidding (Figure 4.). In a co-bidding 
network each vertex represents a bidding company and 
each tie is a tender where firms co-bid. Co-bidding clusters 
where most firms bid with all the others and many different 
firms win contracts suggests healthy competition on the 
face of it (see the green elliptical circle highlighting one 
such dense cluster of bidders). Whereas a firm winning 
many contracts while it bids with companies which always 
lose and only bid with this firm suggests a cartel formation 
(see three red elliptical circles highlighting such network 
formations with large green large vertices representing 
companies winning multiple tenders). 
Figure 4.: Cartels - Some firms only bid together with a winner 
and lose recurrently  
 
These methods can support the collusion screening work of 
competition authorities or other monitoring bodies. 
Identifying high risk markets and companies, where 
additional checks and investigation could be necessary, 
could improve transparency and efficiency of the public 
procurement market. 
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